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ABSTRACT
As a result of massive financial statement frauds at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
Sunbeam, Waste Management, Xerox and others, the US Congress enacted the
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002). This Act sets up the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) which regulates the auditing profession in
the US. The PCAOB issues auditing standards, inspects audit quality and also has
enforcement powers. Following the US lead, nations, such as, Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom have set up national statutory bodies to monitor audit
quality.
This paper summarises the work of these national bodies and synthesises
recent reports of these organisations concerning audit quality. Important lessons
gleaned from this synthesis can be useful for those charged with audit regulation
in India and elsewhere. For example, auditor regulation in India is in its nascent
stage. In August 2013, the Companies Act of 2013 established the National
Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA). NFRA is tasked with the monitoring of audits
of public company financial statements in India, among other mandates. This paper
discusses the draft rules for auditor oversight developed by NFRA and provides
some suggestions as to how countries beginning to develop audit quality inspection
procedures can benefit from the prior experiences of others.

* Corresponding author’s email: rsrivastava@ku.edu
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this paper is to review the audit quality control
approaches by entities such as the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board) in the US and the CPAB (Canadian Public Accountability
Board) in Canada. These agencies oversee and inspect the work of auditors
with the objective of maintaining and enhancing audit quality in their respective
jurisdictions. This paper also synthesises recent reports of these organisations
concerning the results of their inspection activities and contends that the
findings of this synthesis provide significant opportunities to those charged
with audit regulations to further enhance their quality control activities. In
considering these opportunities, we focus on countries which are exploring
methods of audit firm inspection, in particular, India.
The Indian Government recently passed the Companies Act of 2013
(Ministry of Law and Justice-India, 2013), which is similar in nature to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002). The Companies Act of 2013 has
published a “Draft National Financial Reporting Authority Rules, 2013”
describing the authority of NFRA (National Financial Reporting Authority)
related to the accounting and auditing standard setting processes and related
to regulating audit practice. In concept, the role of NFRA is similar to that of
the PCAOB. However, the document “Draft National Financial Reporting
Authority Rules, 2013” does not provide any specific details on how to perform
inspections of audit firms.
Auditor oversight takes different forms in different countries. In some
nations, a quasi-governmental agency, such as the PCAOB, is responsible for
auditor regulation. In other nations, such as Australia, a government agency
(the Australian Securities and Investments Commission - ASIC) is charged with
public inspection of auditors. Some other nations still rely on peer reviews
(Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2012; Anantharaman, 2012). Several national
regulatory agencies use inspectors who are not independent of the practicing
profession and a few do not. Some regulators use non-practitioners or fulltime inspectors who are independent of the profession (Palmrose, 2010). A few
others, use peers for inspections who have the expertise but may not be
independent. Some use peers for inspections of smaller audit firms and
independent inspectors for larger firms (Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2012).
A key aspect of the quality control activities involves the methods used
to select the sample of audit clients that are inspected. The most prominent
one is the risk-based approach that is used by regulators, such as the Canadian
Public Accountability Board (CPAB), the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in
the U.K., the ASIC in Australia, and the PCAOB in the US.
An important feature and potential limitation of this risk-based approach
is that they all use a non-random sampling approach which focus on ‘high
risk’ audit deficiencies in the same areas – fair value measurement, accounting
estimates, managerial judgment, revenue recognition, professional skepticism,
and so on (IFIAR 2012). Since inspectors look for weaknesses only in these
areas, significant audit errors in other areas likely go undetected. Alternative
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approaches, such as the comprehensive approach discussed in Srivastava,
Mock and Ragothaman (2014), may prove to be more effective.
This paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2, 3 and 4 describe auditor
regulation, audit quality oversight and the results of recent inspections in North
America, Europe and then in Australia and Asia. The proposed draft rules
by the NFRA for auditor oversight in India are then discussed in section 5.
A conclusion is provided in section 6.

II. AUDITOR REGULATION IN NORTH AMERICA
In the U.S., the PCAOB is charged with auditor oversight of the audits of
public companies. In February 2013, the PCAOB issued a summary report
about the results of its inspections of smaller1 (< 100 issuer clients) audit firms
between 2007 and 2010. The PCAOB inspected 1,801 audit engagements in
this time period and 28 per cent of these engagements had at least one
significant audit performance deficiency (PCAOB, 2013). The deficiency rate
was 36 per cent during the 2004-2006 period. Table 1 suggests that audit
deficiencies are decreasing over time and this would perhaps suggest that the
PCAOB inspections are contributing to an increase in audit quality.
TABLE 1

PCAOB Triennial Inspection Summary Deficiency Rates
2004–2006

2007–2010

Audit Firms with at least one deficiency

61%

44%

Individual Audits with at least one deficiency

36%

28%

Audit firms inspected twice

55%

36%

Source: PCAOB 2013.

Most of the significant deficiencies were in the areas of the audit of
accounting estimates, revenue recognition, fair value measurements, debt
instruments, business combinations, related party transactions, analytical
procedures and fraud assessment procedures. The PCAOB inspectors identified
a failure to obtain sufficient evidence to support the audit opinion on the
effectiveness of internal controls in 15 per cent of 309 engagements reviewed
in 2010. In addition, in 39 of these 46 engagements, auditors were viewed as
not obtaining sufficient evidence to support their opinion on the financial
statements (PCAOB, 2012a).
The Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) was created in 2003 to
improve the quality of external audits. It is a not-for-profit corporation
established by the Canadian Securities Administrators, the Canadian Institute
of Chartered Accountants, and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions. 2011 CPAB inspection findings included the following. Of the
1 The auditing firms that audit less than 100 public companies annually are inspected
once every three years, while the firms that audit 100 or more public companies are inspected
every year.
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114 Big 4 files inspected for 2011, there were audit deficiencies in 20 to 26
per cent of the files. 47 per cent of 41 files of other annually inspected firms
contained audit deficiencies.
Virtually all of the other inspected firms
(43 smaller firms and 60 engagements) had significant GAAS deficiencies
(CPAB, 2012).
The 2012 inspection findings by the CPAB indicate that of the
128 engagement files inspected from the Big Four firms, 15 to 17 per cent
contained audit deficiencies, showing a 30 per cent reduction from 2011.
However, the improvement was not uniform among the Big 4 firms.
Interestingly, less than two per cent of the auditees had to restate their
financials. Most of the identified deficiencies were in the areas of the audit
of accounting estimates, substantive analytical procedures and audit work on
internal controls. In addition, the CPAB also inspected 83 engagement files from
other firms (CPAB 2013). Most of the identified deficiencies were in the areas
of analytical procedures, work by group auditors, use of management experts,
impairment testing and internal control matters.
The CPAB (2012) concluded that the audit deficiencies found in audits
conducted by Canadian Chartered Accountants are similar to those found by
other regulators in other jurisdictions. CPAB (2012, page 4) states:
“This is not just a Canadian problem. CPAB’s findings are consistent with
those noted by other audit regulators around the world. In particular, they have
also raised concerns about a lack of professional skepticism, inadequate
supervision and review, ineffective substantive analytical procedures, and the poor
quality of evidence in the audit files. Reported deficiency rates in several major
countries are similar to CPAB’s. Matters of greatest concern to regulators are not
country-specific, but relate to the profession at large.”

Auditor oversight in some countries is carried out by governmental
agencies, by peers in other countries and by quasi-governmental agencies,
such as, the PCAOB in other nations. For example, the FRC in the UK is partly
funded by the government and by industry. FRC’s Board is appointed by the
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in the UK. The Public
Oversight Board (POB) which is supervised by the FRC is responsible for audit
inspections in the UK. The PCAOB is a non-profit corporation and its board
members are appointed by the SEC.
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission is a government
agency charged with audit quality inspection. In China, the China Securities
Regulatory Commission and China’s Ministry of Finance exercise oversight
responsibilities over auditors. Similarly, in Italy, the audit profession is heavily
regulated and CONSOB (Commissione nazionale per le societa’ e la borsa), a
public authority responsible for regulating the Italian stock market, is also
responsible for auditor oversight.
Audit inspection findings are made public in many countries. Transparency
of results is good in Australia and Canada. A major part of the findings are
released in England. In the US, the PCAOB issues two types of findings
designated as Part I and Part II Findings. The Part I findings are public and
the Part II findings are released to the public after a year only if the auditing
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firms do not address the deficiencies to the satisfaction of the PCAOB. At the
extreme, are countries, such as Belgium, where no results are made public.
There are other regulatory bodies in mainly emerging economies which follow
the example of Belgium.

III. OVERSIGHT OF THE VARIOUS OVERSIGHT BODIES
The European Group of the Auditors’ Oversight Bodies (EGAOB) was
established by the European Commission in December 2005. A key objective
of this group is to advise the European Commission on statutory audit matters.
EGAOB also plays the role of a coordinator for public oversight systems for
audit firms within the European Union (Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2012).
Maijoor and Vanstraelen discuss the dominant principle used to resolve
coordination issues which is called “home country control.”
The home country control principle suggests, for example, that if a US audit
firm operates in Germany, the US (the home country) regulators will exercise
oversight responsibility over the audit firm operating in Germany. However,
the host country (German) audit regulators have access to all of the inspection
results from the home country (US) regulators. This principle assumes the
quality of audit regulation in the home country is acceptable to the regulators
in the ‘non-home’ countries.
For example, Cohn (2011) reports that the European Commission has
decided to grant “equivalency” to the auditing oversight systems in
10 countries: Australia, Canada, China, Croatia, Japan, Singapore, South
Africa, South Korea, Switzerland and the United States. This may suggest that,
in the eyes of EU, these ten countries have well-established systems of auditor
oversight. According to EU commissioner Barnier (Cohn, 2011), this equivalency
decision can result in three benefits: (1) avoiding duplications in supervisory
work; (2) lowering the inspection burden on audit firms; and (3) promoting highquality audits. Twenty additional third-party countries have been granted a
transitional period by the EU so that these countries can develop their audit
supervisory systems.
In the U.K., the Audit Inspection Unit of the Financial Reporting Council
(FRC) is charged with auditor oversight. Audit inspections in the U.K. are known
for their transparency and independence (Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2012). The
FRC inspected 94 audits in the 2011-2012 time period. Some of the identified
deficiencies were in the areas of revenue recognition, materiality determination,
loan loss provisioning, forbearance, use of specialists, goodwill impairments,
going concern issues, group audits, professional skepticism, and audit work
on internal controls. Thirty-nine of these 94 reviewed audits received the
highest rating - “good with limited improvements required.” Thirty-seven out
of 94 received the mid-level rating – “acceptable overall with improvements
required.” Only 8 of the 94 audits reviewed received the lowest rating –
“significant improvements required.” Deficiencies were noted in the areas of
impairment testing for goodwill and other intangibles, sufficiency of revenue
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tests, review of loan loss provisions, and going concern evaluation (see FRC,
2011-2012).

IV. AUDITOR INSPECTION IN AUSTRALIA AND ASIA
Audit inspection reports by the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) are made public once every 18 months (ASIC, 2012). Listed
companies, banks, insurance companies are called public interest entities
(PIEs) and the auditors of these PIEs are inspected by ASIC. The main purpose
of audit inspections by ASIC is to promote high quality external audits of
financial statements of PIEs. ASIC typically reviews areas involving significant
judgments or management estimates, going concern matters, asset impairments, fair value matters, and others (ASIC, 2012).
ASIC’s public report on their inspection results for 2011-12 indicates that
there were deficiencies in 108 audit areas out of 602 (18 per cent) reviewed
(ASIC, 2012). The ASIC inspectors mainly questioned the sufficiency of the
audit evidence obtained and the degree of professional skepticism exhibited
by external auditors. These deficiencies need not necessarily indicate materially
misstated financial statements, but likely a heightened risk that the statements
may be materially misstated.
Audit regulators from many countries including the Japan, Australia,
Germany, US, UK, and Canada set up the International Forum of Independent
Audit Regulators (IFIAR) in 2006. IFIAR currently has 44 members. IFIAR holds
bi-annual meetings “to exchange information and experiences relating to
inspections of audit firms.” The objectives of IFIAR are: “Sharing knowledge
of the audit market environment and practical experience of independent audit
regulatory activity with a focus on inspections of auditors and audit firms,
promoting collaboration and consistency in regulatory activity, and providing
a platform for dialogue with other international organisations that have
an interest in audit quality (IFIAR, 2010).”
Of 43 members (regulators) who were surveyed by IFIAR in 2012,
39 regulators returned the completed survey (IFIAR, 2012), a response rate of
91 per cent. The members used their most recent inspection results to answer
the survey questions. The most recent audit inspections by these 39 regulators
ended during the period between December 2010 and June 2012. The IFIAR
collected inspection information from 22 regulators on their inspection of
961 audit engagements of Public Interest Entities (PIEs). There were
1,072 individual deficiencies (findings) and several engagements had no
deficiencies while others had one or more deficiencies. The audit deficiency
findings were related to 13 inspection themes. The top six deficiency themes
are fair value measurements (16%), internal control testing (11%), engagement
quality control reviews (11%), adequacy of review and supervision (11%),
adequacy of financial statements and disclosures (10%), and revenue
recognition (8%) (see Table 2).
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The IFIAR 2012 survey respondents also indicated that the most frequently
noted challenges and audit quality issues were: (1) failure to exhibit adequate
professional skepticism (54%), (2) failure to gather sufficient audit evidence
regarding managerial judgments (46%) and (3) insufficient execution of
engagement quality control review (42%).
TABLE 2

IFIAR 2012 Survey of Inspection Findings of
Public Interest Entities (PIES)
Number
of PIEs

Percentage

Fair Value Measurements

169

16%

Internal Control Testing

117

11%

Engagement Quality Control Reviews

116

11%

Adequacy of Review and Supervision

115

11%

Adequacy of Financial Statements & Disclosures

109

10%

86

8%

Inspection Themes

Revenue Recognition
Source: IFIAR 2012.

The IFIAR (2012, page 20) report concludes:
“The frequency of findings across jurisdictions in the various audit areas
demonstrates that audit firms should continue to improve their auditing techniques
and also their oversight policies and procedures. The fact that so many findings
recur year after year in the same inspection theme areas, suggests that audit firms
should take steps to develop a robust root cause analysis to gain a clearer
understanding of the factors that underlie these findings and take appropriate
actions to remediate those inspection findings.”

Professional skepticism involves having a questioning mind while analysing
audit evidence2 . It does not require auditors to be suspicious of their clients,
but they should not be too trusting of their clients. It is a mindset that auditors
should develop accumulating evidence. Auditors should be alert to inconsistencies in statements from different client personnel. Hard questions have to
be asked without developing a confrontational attitude toward clients (Gunn
and Jules, 2012). Auditors may want to learn about two types of skepticisms —
Trait and State skepticism. Trait skepticism refers to the relatively stable and
enduring individual characteristic of a “questioning mind.” State skepticism
refers to a temporary state of skepticism aroused by engagement circumstances
or situational variables.

2 According to the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB):
“Professional skepticism is an essential attitude that enhances the auditor’s ability to identify
and respond to conditions that may indicate possible misstatement. It includes a critical
assessment of audit evidence. It also means being alert for audit evidence that contradicts
other audit evidence or that brings into question the reliability of information obtained from
management and those charged with governance” (Gunn and Jules, 2012).
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Auditors are subject to biases and even well-trained auditors can miss
misstatements in financial statements. NFRA may want to stress the
importance of professional skepticism for auditors in India. Audit staff practice
risk alert no. 10 (PCAOB, 2012b), in fact, provides detailed guidance to
the US auditors about applying professional skepticism in the conduct of
audits. The NFRA can follow the example of PCAOB (2012b) and issue audit
practice risk alerts to emphasise noteworthy concepts or circumstances that
may help auditors to conduct high quality audits.

V. PROPOSED AUDITOR REGULATION IN INDIA
As mentioned in the introduction, India has recently set up its own quasigovernmental auditor oversight organisation, the National Financial Reporting
Authority (NFRA). The Companies Act of 2013 established the NFRA as the
monitoring agency for auditors in August 2013. According to Rule 132 of the
Companies Act of 2013, NFRA, once it is passed by the Central Government,
will have the following responsibilities:
l

l

l

Make recommendations to the Central Government on the formulation
and laying down of accounting and auditing policies and standards
for adoption by companies and/or their auditors.
Monitor and enforce the compliance with accounting standards and
auditing standards.
Oversee the quality of service of the professions associated with
ensuring compliance with such standards, and suggest measures
required for improvement in quality of service and such other related
matters as may be prescribed.

NFRA will consist of nine full time members and some part-time members
not to exceed a total of fifteen members. These members are to be appointed
by the Central Government and should have expertise in auditing, accounting,
finance or law. NFRA will function in the form of three committees: Committee
on Accounting Standards, Committee on Auditing Standards, Committee on
Enforcement. The Committee on Accounting Standards has similar roles as the
FASB in the US. The roles of the Committee on Auditing Standards and the
Committee on Enforcement are similar to PCAOB responsibilities in the US.
Committee on auditing standards and its functions
The Committee on Auditing Standards will be comprised of 7 members and
will have the responsibility to examine the matters relating to the formulation
of auditing standards and making recommendations for any new standard or
amendments to NFRA.
Under the monitoring responsibility, the Committee on Auditing Standards
shall monitor the compliance of auditors with accounting and auditing
standards and must submit period reports to NFRA. For this purpose, the
Committee on Auditing Standards will perform the following (see NFRA, 2013
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for details):
l

l

l

Investigate or review selected audit and review engagements, including
specifically the working papers;
Evaluate the sufficiency of the quality control system of the auditor,
and the manner of the documentation and communication;
Perform such other testing of the audit, supervisory, and quality
control procedures of the auditor as considered necessary or
appropriate.

NFRA rules specify the minimum qualification for inspectors who will
perform the above inspections. Such inspectors should have at least 10 years
of auditing experience and exposure to audits of the relevant industry. NFRA
2013 allows the Committee on Auditing Standards to seek the assistance of
ICAI (the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India) in conducting such
investigation or in any other manner as may be approved by NFRA. NFRA 2013
rules also allow outsourcing of inspection, up to a period of two years from
the commencement of NFRA rules. The Committee on Auditing Standards will
issue a non-public portion of the report of the company or professional, subject
to the approval of NFRA, and refer matters to NFRA to decide on further course
of action, through the Committee on Enforcement. If there have been violations
of laws, rules or professional standards as indicated in the report, the
Committee on Enforcement can trigger investigations, disciplinary action, or
refer the matter to other regulators or law enforcement agencies.
In addition to the above inspection and reporting requirements to improve
the audit quality, Rule 144 of the Companies Act 2013 does not permit auditors
to provide certain non-audit services to their clients, similar to the PCAOB
restrictions. Also, according to Rule 139 of the Companies Act of 2013, the
audit partner must rotate every five years and the audit firm must rotate every
10 years. This is somewhat similar to the European model which requires audit
firm rotation every 10 to 24 years (Chasan, 2014). After 10 years,
a company can extend the auditor rotation time frame if it puts up the audit
contract for a new bid at the end of 10 years or if it appoints a joint auditor.
While mandatory auditor rotation has been approved by the European
Parliament, the PCAOB in the US has abandoned its auditor rotation proposal,
at least temporarily (Ryan, 2014). Audit committees in the US were opposed
to the firm rotation proposal since they felt it would encroach upon the key
role of audit committees to hire and fire auditors on the basis of their
performance. Note that the PCAOB already requires engagement (lead) partner
rotation every five years and the lead partner has to sit out for five years. Such
a partner rotation could be bringing in a fresh set of eyes and could be
enhancing professional skepticism. Proponents of mandatory firm rotation
argue that it would increase auditor’s “independence in fact and appearance,”
and decrease market concentration of the Big 4 firms (Ewelt-Knauer et al.,
2012). Opponents of the mandatory firm rotation argue that it could potentially
lead to more audit failures, would increase set-up costs, and may adversely
affect audit quality (Ewelt-Knauer et al., 2012). Benefits of mandatory firm
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rotation could be achieved by mandatory lead partner rotation since new lead
partners will bring a fresh set of eyes and perspectives once every five years.
More importantly, some nations have first adopted mandatory firm rotation only
to reject it later on after some bad experience with it and these countries include
Latvia, South Korea, Canada, Czech Republic, Singapore and Slovak Republic
(Ernst and Young, 2013). NFRA may want to consider the experiences of these
countries and could benefit from a thoughtful examination of pros and cons
of mandatory firm rotation.
Challenges in monitoring and inspecting audit quality
While the draft NFRA rules lay down the authority and responsibility for
NFRA to monitor the work of auditors to maintain the audit quality, it does
not provide any guidance as to the process of monitoring. For example, as an
inspector, it is important to know answers to the following questions. How to
select which company’s audit work papers to inspect for a given audit firm?
How many companies, i.e., clients, to inspect for a given audit firm? How to
select which accounts and transaction cycles to inspect in detail to identify
audit deficiencies?
The PCAOB and other countries identified earlier have been using a risk
based approach for their inspection process (CAQ, 2012). However, there are
some problems in such an approach.
Srivastava, Mock and Ragothaman (2014) have proposed a conceptual
framework for the audit quality inspection process, which incorporates aspects
of the risk-based approach. They demonstrate through a case study how the
PCAOB’s risk-based approach could miss major audit deficiencies if the fraud
is perpetrated in a non-risky account such as cash. Satyam Computer Services
Limited (Bhasin, 2013) is such an example where not only the audit firm, PwC,
failed to detect material fraud in the cash account but also the PCAOB
inspection team failed to detect the fraud and any related audit deficiencies.
Basically, the purpose of the audit inspection process is to determine
whether the auditor has collected sufficient competent evidential matter to
support the audit opinion provided. If in the judgment of the inspector,
the auditor has failed to achieve the above objective, that is, did not collect
sufficient competent evidence to render the opinion, the inspector will then
identify the deficiencies in the audit process. In most jurisdictions, a non-public
opinion about the deficiencies of the audit process will be communicated to
the audit firm and eventually public disclosures of some of the findings will
be made public. The inspector also may be required to report to enforcement
entities for further action if any disciplinary actions are needed to be taken
against the auditor.
Such a process is expected to improve the quality of the audit. However,
given the weaknesses in current inspection processes, for example the Satyam
case discussed earlier, it is not clear, especially within the Indian context, how
such audit quality inspection should be modified to enhance performance. As
mentioned earlier, the draft National Financial Reporting Authority Rules (NFRA
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2013) describes only the responsibilities for such an inspection but does not
provide guidance as to how the inspection is to be performed.
The Center for Audit Quality in the US has recently published a guide on
the PCAOB’s risk-based approach (CAQ, 2012) for conducting an audit quality.
Srivastava, Mock and Ragothaman (2014) have proposed a comprehensive
framework for audit quality inspections and point out possible shortcomings
of the PCAOB’s current approach.
In order to develop a conceptual framework for the audit inspection process
within the Indian context, we first need to understand the audit process in
India. Looking at the various Standards on Auditing (SA) promulgated by the
ICAI (Institute of Chartered Accountants of India) such as SA 315 — Identifying
and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement Through Understanding the
Entity and Its Environment, SA 330 — The Auditor’s Responses to Assessed
Risks, and SA 240 (Revised) — The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud
in an Audit of Financial Statements, we see that the audit process in India is
similar to the process in the US (PCAOB, 2005). Thus, an approach similar
to Srivastava, Mock and Ragothaman (2014) for US may be useful in the Indian
context. Their approach is based on evidential reasoning and may decrease
the likelihood of such omissions as in the case of Satyam.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Following the US lead in setting up the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to regulate the auditing profession, several other
nations, such as, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan, have
set up national statutory bodies to monitor auditor work in their respective
countries. This paper summarises the work of these national bodies in recent
years and synthesises recent reports of these organisations which summarise
the public results of their inspections. Important lessons gleaned from this
synthesis can be useful for those charged with audit regulation in India
(e.g. NFRA) which is in its nascent stage.
A key lesson is that the commonly identified inspection deficiencies across
jurisdictions relate mainly to general audit profession’s weaknesses rather than
country-specific issues. Thus, for example, NFRA should develop detailed
policies and procedures for examining estimates and judgment issues as
weaknesses in this area have been identified in most reports on audit
inspection results. Some of the other lessons would include developing a riskbased inspection programme, emphasising professional skepticism, and
completing a thoughtful consideration of a mandatory firm rotation policy.
Inspection findings across countries tend to recur in the same areas such
as fair value accounting, revenue recognition, judgments, internal control
testing, quality control reviews, and adequacy of disclosures (see Table 2). This
would suggest that auditors across countries would do well to perform root
cause analyses of these identified weaknesses in audit performance and take
meaningful actions to remediate inspection findings. Perhaps the auditing
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profession could learn from air traffic studies, emergency hospital procedure
studies, and engineers who perform rigorous “failure studies” and come up with
effective models for improvement (Peterson, 2014).
In addition to summarising the findings of several national audit
regulators, this paper also discusses the draft rules for auditor oversight
developed by the NFRA in India. We discuss the importance of professional
skepticism on the part of auditors while performing financial statement audits.
NFRA may wish to consider the experiences of countries that first adopted firm
rotation only to abandon it later and should carefully weigh the costs and
benefits of adopting the policy of mandatory audit firm rotation.
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Annual Seminar & AGM
IAA Research Foundation Announces its Annual Seminar
on Saturday the 26th July, 2014, jointly with International
Management Institute (IMI) - Kolkata.
Topic : Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)
Venue : Seminar Hall (Room No. 104)
International Management Institute (IMI) – Kolkata
2/4C, Judges Court Road, Alipore, Kolkata – 700 027.
Inauguration will be at 10.00 a.m. After inauguration,
G. D. Roy Memorial Lecture will be held in the first technical
session (10.45 a.m. – 12.15 p.m.).
The Seminar will be followed by Annual General Meeting
in the same venue.
For further details visit Foundation’s website iaarf.in

